For many
would-be inheritors, matters of inheritance matter! Will Aid’s 2012 survey revealed that:
- 60% of 18-24 year olds would use an inheritance to buy a home;
- 48% of 35-44 year olds would repay their mortgage; and
- 40% of 45-54 year olds would
use an inheritance to provide a pension.
With its emphasis on testamentary freedom, English law can quite easily thwart the hopes of expectant inheritors though. No surprise, then, that solicitors feel that disagreements over wills are on the increase, some of which may turn into full-blown disputes. This trend means that the will-making process itself will come under close scrutiny, as disappointed heirs call for evidence in order to weigh up the risks and benefits to them of challenging the last will. The will-making process is no place to cut corners if you want a will that will stand up in court.
One of the ways
to challenge a will is to prove that the will-maker lacked testamentary
capacity. This is always a fruitful
source of case law as, while the leading case for assessing capacity in England
remains the 1870 case of Banks v Goodfellow, certainly for pre-Mental Capacity Act 2005 wills,
the nuances of what it means to be able to demonstrate testamentary capacity in
the 21st century still need to be worked through.
In the
recent Court of Appeal case of Simon v Byford and others ([2014] EWCA Civ 280), an elderly mother with mild
to moderate dementia made a significant amendment to her will. Her new will did not give all her shares in
the family company to her son, Robert.
Thus the carefully laid plan of the old will, to give Robert the shares
and thereby hand him a sizeable holding to help avoid disputes with his brother
and sister was undermined entirely. The
unfortunate circumstances of the will execution – mother signing a home-made will
at her 88th birthday party at which Robert’s two other
siblings were present but not Robert – probably did not help keep the matter out
of court.
Robert argued
that, as his mother lacked the capacity to remember the reason why her old will
had been carefully written in those terms, she lacked testamentary capacity to
make her new will. However, the judge
declined to accept that argument, noting that capacity “depends on the
potential to understand. It is not to be
equated to a test of memory”. It was not
necessary for the mother to comprehend the significance to Robert of leaving
her shares unequally instead of equally.
All that was required was that the will-maker understood the immediate
consequences – that changing her will so that the children received equal
shares meant that Robert would receive the same as his other siblings.
So it is not
necessary for would-be will-makers to appreciate the “collateral consequences” of making changes to the distribution of assets in the
will. However, anyone wanting to
minimise the potential for costly disputes in future might conclude that it
would be sensible at least to get out the previous will and record that a review
of the thinking behind it was carried out.
Best waiting until after the family party though.